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Abstract 
 
 
   Security has been widely recognized as one of the 
main obstacles to the adoption of Internet banking 
and it is considered an important aspect in the 
debate over challenges facing internet banking. The 
performance evaluation of e-banking websites 
requires a model that enables us to analyze the 
various imperative factors and criteria related to the 
quality and performance of e-banking websites. E-
banking site evaluation is a complex and dynamic 
problem involving many factors, and because of the 
subjective considerations and the ambiguities 
involved in the assessment, Fuzzy Logic (FL) model 
can be an effective tool in assessing and evaluating 
of e-banking security performance and quality. In 
this paper, we propose an intelligent performance 
assessment model for evaluating e-banking security 
websites. The proposed model is based on FL 
operators and produces four measures of security 
risk attack dimensions: direct internal attack, 
communication tampering attack, code programming 
attack and denial of service attack with a 
hierarchical ring layer structure. Our experimental 
results show that direct internal attack risk has a 
large impact on e-banking security performance. The 
results also confirm that the risk of direct internal 
attack for e-banking dynamic websites is doubled 
that of all other attacks. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
   Electronic banking systems provide users with easy 
access to banking services, including, retrieving the 
balance of an account, money transfers between 
accounts, retrieving an account history, etc [8].  
   The number of personal computers and internet 
users are increasing. Customers often like to use new 
information technologies for the various online 
transactions related internet banking and online 
shopping. In online shopping, the internet provides 
customers with the selection flexibility and saves 
them a great deal of time in making shopping 
decisions. The increasing volume of electronic 
commerce generates a corresponding demand for 
electronic payment processes offered by financial 
institutions and banks. Furthermore, other follow-up 
activities such as paying bills, transferring funds 
between accounts, and credit card-related 
transactions need to be processed online [7]. 
Therefore, the customer-oriented demand on internet 
banking increases.  
Security has been widely recognized as one of 
the main obstacles to the adoption of internet 
banking [4]. The performance evaluation of e-
banking websites requires a model that enables us to 
analyse the various important factors related to the 
quality and performance of e-banking websites. 
Since e-banking site evaluation is a complex and 
dynamic problem, Fuzzy Logic (FL) can be an 
effective tool in assessing and evaluating e-banking 
security performance since FL offers a natural way 
of dealing with quality factors rather than exact 
values. 
In this paper, we investigate the different quality 
dimensions related to internet banking security by 
trying to answer questions such as: What are the 
most important criteria with reference to security that 
satisfies e-banking customers and bankers. Moreover, 
we design and formulate a simple method to assess 
the quality of e-banking websites for customers and 
decision-makers. The different criteria selected for 
evaluating the e-banking websites are derived 
through a comprehensive investigation, exploratory 
fieldwork, interviews, observations, survey 
questionnaire, automated assessing scanning tools 
and consultation with several experts. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
presents the methodology used to collect data and 
Section 3 discusses the security architecture of 
internet banking and FL Expert System. Section 5 
presents the proposed FL model for e-banking 
security performance and quality assessment. Section 
6 shows the different rule base structure and entries 
for all the proposed model phases. Section 7 reveals 
the implementation results after defuzzification 
process and then conclusions are given in Section 8. 
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2. Research Methodology 
 
2.1 Exploratory Fieldworks: Case Study 
 
   We conducted an exploratory fieldwork case study 
on leading private-sector banks in Jordan over three-
month period to achieve the research objectives.  
The research techniques used in the case study are: 
open and semi-structured interviews, observations 
and participation in the project management, and 
review of documents. We used an open and semi 
structured interviews with the senior executives of 
the IT department, e-security and e-banking 
operations in the banks.  
   We discovered from the conducted interviews that 
internet banking in Jordan is facing difficulties that 
limit the development of e-banking services in the 
future. These difficulties include: lack of regulations, 
policies and e-banking laws and legislation to protect 
customers from internet fraud, lack of internet 
connections speed and telecommunications 
infrastructures, lack of internet awareness culture and 
general computer skills, high internet connection 
costs and finally security, privacy and trust problems 
that highly influence the acceptance of internet 
banking and increases the fear of using it [3].  
 
2.2 Mail Questionnaire Survey 
 
   We designed a mail questionnaire, which has been 
sent to a number of random Jordan Ahli Bank 
employees and clients. The primary objectives of the 
questionnaire were (1) to assess the satisfaction of 
customers regarding the performance quality and 
security procedures of Jordan Ahli Bank internet 
banking website (2) to reveal the perception of 
clients in terms of using the internet both as 
communication tool and as a delivery channel.  
   The questionnaire survey showed that the security 
factor is considered one of the most important factors 
related to e-banking since services such as money 
transfers and electronic payments cannot be 
vulnerable to any kind of attacks [19]. Furthermore, 
the lack of assurance, trust, privacy and security 
hinder the e-banking development. In other words, 
when customers don’t trust security and privacy in e-
banking, they don’t make transactions related to 
money via the internet [20].  
 
2.3 Automatic Security Scanning Tools 
 
   With the help of automated hacking and cracking 
tools as well as web scanner applications, we 
managed to test and assess the level of security and 
vulnerability of the e-banking websites case study. 
This process helped us in determining and analyzing 
the critical factors related to scanning, testing and 
assessing e-banking websites performance factors. 
For example, we used Acunetix Web Vulnerability 
Scanner (WVS) [1] for automatically testing web 
sites for vulnerabilities such as SQL attacks, Cross 
Site Scripting, CRLF injection, Directory Traversal, 
Authentication Hacking and Google Hacking.  
   So we can see from the case study, the survey 
conducted, and the automatic security scanning tools 
that the greatest challenge to e-banking websites is 
winning the trust of customers over privacy and 
security. Different quality and performance 
dimensions related to internet banking security 
assessment were also produced from these 
experiments as well as specifying all the security 
risks categories and criteria that can damage and 
hinder e-banking websites and threat their existence. 
 
3. Internet Banking and Fuzzy Logic 
 
3.1 Internet Banking Security Architecture 
 
There are many threats that any internet banking 
dynamic website can fall into, including, spoofing, 
denial-of-service attack, SQL injection, phishing 
attacks, sniffing, page hijacking, brute force, buffer 
overflows, and social engineering. Financial 
institutions engaging in any form of internet banking 
should have effective and reliable methods to 
authenticate their customers. These methods include, 
the use of customer passwords, personal 
identification numbers(PIN), digital certificates using 
public key infrastructure (PKI), physical devices 
such as smart cards, one-time passwords (OTPs), 
USB plug0-ins, transaction profile scripts, and 
biometric identification [11]. Moreover, most 
internet banks offer other protective measures to 
ensure information is safe and secure such as secure 
logins, limited logins (lock out if exceed) and limited 
sessions (require to re-login if inactive for a period of 
time [18]. 
   Internet attackers have become more sophisticated 
since they moved from network level attacks such as 
abusing firewall and filtering rules to application 
level, that of attacking and exploiting code within 
web applications such as SQL injections or input 
validation attacks and direct internal level such as 
social engineering and phishing attacks. 
Direct internal attacks are the primary threat to 
computer systems since they are likely to have 
specific goals and objectives, and have legitimate 
access to the system. This type of attack can be 
extremely difficult to detect or protect against [13]. 
The direct internal attack can affect all components 
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of computer security and the confidentiality of 
information on the system. 
 
3.2 FL Expert System 
 
A fuzzy expert system is an expert system that uses 
FL instead of Boolean logic. In other words, it is a 
collection of membership functions and rules that are 
utilised to reason about data [6].  
Fuzzy approach requires sufficient expert 
knowledge in the formulation of the rule base, the 
combination of the sets and the defuzzification. In 
General, the employment of FL might be helpful for 
complex processes such as when there is no simple 
mathematical model. Fourali [12] highlights the 
relevance of FL to the task of measuring educational 
achievement in which he introduced the principles 
behind FL and illustrated how these principles could 
be applied by educators in the area of assessment 
using portfolio evidence. Murphy [17] discussed the 
primary risk factors in developing projects and the 
keys to a successful risk management programme. 
Cox [9] examined the organisation of a business rule 
systems and looked at how these rules should be 
organised and written in order to address the 
uncertainty and imprecision of business decisions 
using FL.  
Abdul Rahim [2] showed the utilisation of fuzzy 
technology in modeling subjective, vague and 
uncertain web usability and design guidelines. 
Yuksel [20] determined the key quality dimensions 
in internet banking using survey questionnaire. 
Davoli [10] presented a Fuzzy Quality Tree for web 
inspection (FQT4web), a qualitative, robust and 
efficient inspector-based methodology for website 
evaluation that has a hierarchical structure. In his 
paper, he produced six measures of quality 
dimensions and an overall quality score for web sites. 
Finally, Alasgarova [5] examined the beneficial 
aspects of using fuzzy database for credit risk 
prediction decision. 
The inference process in FL goes through four 
steps [9] Fuzzification, . Inference, Composition and 
Defuzzification. 
 
4. System Design 
  
Since FL offers a more natural way of assessing 
security factors instead of exact values, we used it to 
evaluate and assess the security of the dynamic 
internet banking websites by classifying all the 
online security risks, threats and vulnerability 
according to an important weight. This classification 
will enable us to produce an overall security score 
for an e-banking website. The proposed system 
shown in Figure 1 has been implemented in 
MATLAB and is designed using four main e-
banking risk criteria, including: Direct internal attack 
risk, communication tampering attack risk, code 
programming attack risk and denial of service attack 
risk. Two IT auditors from each bank (5 banks) and a 
questionnaire have been used for judging the 
importance of the above four criterions.  
From each case-study, we choose two IT 
auditors to answer the questionnaire, which consisted 
of 80 scaled questions (20 questions for each risk). 
Instructions have been given to the IT auditors to tick 
the corresponding box on the satisfaction scale, then 
to decide the minimum position and the maximum 
position he/s accepts. For instance, an assessor might 
think that question 2 for the selected risk criteria is 
fair but not strong, hence he may tick box 5 on the 
scale, and then he may realize also that a lower rating, 
i.e. 4 is acceptable [12]. Calculation of the 
assessment criteria can be computed as follows: 
Average outcome: (1*1+2*2+2*3+3*4+2*5)/10 = 
3.3 
Analysis of the data collected from the IT auditors 
revealed that the internal direct attack is the highest 
security risk factor, and other risks have lower 
impact. In other words, the internal direct risk attack 
factor is double that of others. The internal direct 
attack deals with human factor, which is not easy to 
be controlled and managed. On the other hand, the 
other security risk factors can be controlled and 
eliminated by the various kinds of hardwares and 
softwares such as: firewalls, automated scanning 
tools and antivirus applications to protect the 
network. The complete framework is demonstrated 
in Figure 1 with all criteria. 
 
 
Figure 1: Structure of the system in MATLAB 
 
 
Figure 2 : Ring layer 1 - Phase 2 evaluation 
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Figure 3 : Pahse 3 evaluation - Final Security 
Rating 
 
5. System Criteria 
 
5.1 Criteria Considered in Evaluating the 
Security of E-banking Sites 
Security assessment is performed based on four 
risk attack criteria: direct internal attack, 
communication tampering attack, code programming 
attack and denial of service attack. There are four 
components for each criterion as shown in Table 1, 
which explains the relationship between criteria and 
components. Table 1 also shows that there are two 
ring layers, where the first ring layer contains: 
communication tampering attack, code programming 
attack and denial of service attack and the second 
ring layer contains only the direct internal attack. 
The proposed model is based on fuzzy operators 
for e-banking website security evaluation, which 
produces four measures of security risk attack 
dimensions with a hierarchical ring layer structure. 
The four criteria have been prioritized according to 
their importance using weights as concluded from 
the survey where each criterion is divided further 
into four components as shown in Table 1. 
Developed in the model are two ring layers where 
the criteria of the least important ones are placed in 
the first layer with a weight equal to 0.2, and their 
union produces Rule base 2 ( Phase 2 evaluation). 
The criteria with the greater importance are placed in 
the second ring layer and assigned a weight of 0.4, 
and it produces rule base 1 (Direct internal attack 
evaluation) as shown in Figure 3. The combination 
of rule base 2 and rule base 1 derives rule base 3 
(Phase 3 evaluation) which represents the final 
security rating as shown in Figure 4. 
  
Final Rating = 0.4* Direct internal attack crisp 
[second ring layer] +  ((0.2*Communication 
tampering attack crisp)+(0.2*Code programming 
attack crisp) + (0.2 *Denial of service attack crisp)) 
[First ring layer]   Or 
Final Rating = 0.4* Direct internal attack Crisp 
[second ring layer] +0.6*Phase 3 crisp [First ring 
layer] 
 
Table 1: Layers of  e-banking risk attacks criteria. 
 
5.2 Primary Inputs and Output of the System 
 
   There are four criteria and for each criterion there 
are four components. Therefore, there are sixteen 
components in total, where for each component, five 
questions are defined and a component is judged on 
the scale 1-5 inclusive based on the outcome of these 
five questions. Each component takes one integer 
value as primary input [14]. Membership values of 
the three fuzzy sets (“low risk”, ”moderate risk”, 
“high risk”) were produced using fuzzification to the 
integer crisp values of the four components of each 
criterion. Defining five output fuzzy sets: 
“annoying”, “harmful“, “destructive”, (triangular 
membership function) and “safe”,”catastrophic” 
(Trapezoidal membership function). 
 
6. The Rule Base 
 
6.1 The Rule Base for Phase 1 
 
   The rule base has four input parameters and one 
output and contains all the “IF-THEN” rules of the 
system. For each entry of the rule base, each 
component is assumed to be one of three values and 
each criterion has four components. Therefore, the 
rule base contains (34) = 81entries. A sample of the 
structure and the entries of the rule base for phase 1 
are shown in Table 2. The system structure for direct 
internal attack is the joining of its four components 
Criteria No. Component Layer nol 
1 Phishing Attack 
2 Social Engineering 
3 Brute Force 
 
Direct 
internal 
attack 
4 Insider Attack 
Layer Two 
(2) 
Second Ring
Subtotal 
Weight = 
1 Sniffing 
2 Spoofing  
3 Port Scans 
 
Communicati
on tampering 
attack 4 Page Hijacking 
1 SQL Injection 
2 Buffer Overflow 
3 Cross Site Scripting 
 
Code 
programming 
attack 4 Trojan Horse 
1 Ping of Death 
2 Ping Flood 
3 Man in the Middle  
 
Denial of 
service attack 
 
(Weight =0.2) 4 Smurf Attack 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Layer One 
(1) 
First Ring 
 
 
Subtotal 
Weight = 
0.6 
Total Weight  1 
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Table 4: Rule Base 3 structure and entries for 
phase 3 
R
ul
e 
 Phase 2 Direct Internal 
Attack 
Final 
Security 
Rating 
1 Low Risk Low Risk Safe 
2 Low Risk Moderate Risk Destructive 
3 Low Risk High Risk Catastrophic 
4 Moderate Risk Low Risk Annoying 
5 Moderate Risk Moderate Risk Destructive 
6 Moderate Risk High Risk Catastrophic 
7 High Risk Low Risk Harmful 
8 High Risk Moderate Risk Destructive 
9 High Risk High Risk Catastrophic
(phishing attack, social engineering attack, insider 
attack, and brute force attack), which produces the 
direct internal attack rule base 1.  
 
Table 2 : Sample of the rule base1 structure and 
entries for direct internal attack  valuation 
Ru
le
 Phishing 
Attack 
Social 
Engineeri
ng Attack 
Insider 
Attack 
Brute 
Force 
Attack 
Direct 
Internal  
Attack 
1 Low Risk Low Risk Low Risk Low Risk Safe 
3 Low Risk Low Risk Low Risk High Risk Harmful 
27 Low Risk High Risk High Risk High Risk Catastrophic 
28 Mod. Risk Low Risk Low Risk Low Risk Annoying 
30 Mod. Risk Low Risk Low Risk High Risk Harmful 
54 Mod. Risk High Risk High Risk High Risk Destructive 
55 High Risk Low Risk Low Risk Low Risk Harmful 
57 High Risk Low Risk Low Risk High Risk Destructive 
79 High Risk High Risk High Risk Low Risk Catastrophic 
 
6.2 The Rule Base for Phase 2 
In phase 2, there are three inputs, which are (denial 
of service attack, communication tampering attack 
and code programming attack) and one output. A 
sample of the structure and the entries of the rule 
base for phase 2 are illustrated in Table 3. 
The system structure for phase 2 is the combination 
of three attacks (denial of service attack, 
communication tampering attack and code 
programming attack), which produces rule base 2. 
 
Table 3 :  Rule Base2 structure and entries for 
phase 2 
 
6.3 The Rule Base for Phase 3 
   In phase 3, there are two inputs, which are: the 
direct internal attack and “Phase2”which is the 
output from phase 2, and one output. The structure 
and the entries of the rule base for phase 3 are shown 
in Table 4. 
The system structure for phase 3 is the combination 
of direct internal attack and “Phase2”, which 
produces rule base 3 and the final security rating. 
7. Defuzzification and Interesting 
experimental Results 
 
 Clipping method [15] is used in aggregating the 
consequences and the aggregated surface of the rule 
evaluation is defuzzified using Mamdani method [16] 
to find the Center Of Gravity (COG). Centroid 
defuzzification technique shown in equation (1) can 
be expressed as where x* is the defuzzified output, 
µi(x) is the aggregated membership function and x is 
the output variable.  
 
 
Equation (1) 
 
The proposed intelligent e-banking website 
security evaluation system has been implemented in 
MATLAB 6.5. The results of some input 
combinations are listed in Tables 5, 6. The security 
rating will be low (15.6 %), which means that the e-
banking website is secure, highly protected and hard 
to be hacked or penetrated when all risk attacks have 
zero inputs. Further, the security rating will be high 
(84.4 %), which means that the e-banking website is 
not secured enough and can be easily hacked or 
penetrated when the direct internal attack has 10 
inputs values and all other risks values have zero 
inputs as shown in Table 5.  Whereas, the security 
risk attack will be equilibrium (50%), which means 
that the e-banking site is somehow secure and 
protected but it can be penetrated or hacked when the 
direct internal attack has zero input and all other risk 
attacks have the value of 10 inputs as shown in Table 
6. This result shows that the direct internal attack is 
more important than all other risk attacks.  
 
Table 5: Four highest (10) inputs for criteria 
(Direct internal attack) and all other lowest (0) 
inputs 
R
ul
e 
 Denial of 
Service 
Attack 
Communic
ation 
Attack 
Code 
Programming 
Attack 
Rating 
1 Low Risk Low Risk Low Risk Safe 
2 Low Risk Low Risk Mod. Risk Annoying 
9 Low Risk High Risk High Risk Destructive 
10 Mod. Risk Low Risk Low Risk Annoying 
12 Mod. Risk Low Risk High Risk Harmful 
18 Mod. Risk High Risk High Risk Catastrophic 
19 High Risk Low Risk Low Risk Harmful 
20 High Risk Low Risk Mod. Risk Harmful 
27 High Risk High Risk High Risk Catastrophic 
N
o  
Denial of 
Service 
Attack 
Communic
ation 
Attack 
Code 
Programm 
Attack 
Direct 
Internal 
Attack 
% 
Security 
Rating 
1 10 10 10 0 
2 10 10 10 0 
3 10 10 10 0 
4 10 10 10 0 
 
50.0 
 
 6
 
Table 6: Four lowest (0) inputs for criteria (Direct 
internal attack) and all other highest (10) inputs 
 
8. Conclusions and Future Work 
 
In this paper, we proposed an intelligent performance 
assessment model for e-banking security evaluation 
websites. Fuzzy Logic (FL) was used in the design 
phase and MATLAB was utilised in the 
implementation phase of our model. The results 
indicate that the worst security rate equals 87.5% and 
the best security rate is 15.6% rather than a full range, 
i.e. 0 to 100, because of the fuzzification process. 
Moreover, the results show that the direct internal 
attack risk has a large impact on e-banking security 
performance since it achieves a security rate of to 
84.4 %.  
Interesting results can also be noticed when the 
direct internal attack has four input values from ten, 
and all other attacks have (0) input value since the 
security rating produced was 55.7%. This means that 
the e-banking website is somehow secure, but it can 
be penetrated.  Proper training of e-banking 
customers on recognising and avoiding the direct 
internal security attacks may help improving the 
security and enhancing the customers overall 
confidence over long terms. The utilisation of FL in 
assessing e-banking security evaluation is still wide 
open research area, which can reveal quite 
interesting results. We are going to examine in near 
future how the results and security rate are changed 
when more risk criteria, ring layers and different 
relative importance weight for these risks are added 
and taken into accounts. 
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N
o  
Denial of 
Service 
Attack 
Communic
ation 
Attack 
Code 
Programm 
Attack 
Direct 
Internal 
Attack 
% 
Security 
Rating 
1 0 0 0 10 
2 0 0 0 10 
3 0 0 0 10 
4 0 0 0 10 
 
84.4 
 
